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Social partners’ bargaining strategies in Germany and Spain after the introduction of 
the Euro: a morphogenetic perspective on corporate agency 
 
This article addresses how far wage imbalances in the Eurozone can be imputable to 
intentional agency by collective bargaining organisations. Using Archer’s morphogenetic 
approach, we explain the agentic role of social partners in core (Germany) and periphery 
(Spain) cases, in relation with the respective collective bargaining regimes. We show that the 
capacity of macro- and meso-level organisations to effect wage-setting practices can be 
constrained inadvertently by contextual influences with morphostatic properties, generating 
constrained modes of corporate agency. Yet wage moderation is best understood as a form of 
agency itself, functioning ‘by being’ rather than ‘doing’, which over time can become more 
innovative. We contrast this finding with the less constrained capacity of more 
institutionalized corporate agents, such as transnational business corporations and central 
state agencies. 
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The relationship between structure and agency has been an underlying theme in industrial 
relations debates. In sociological theory, a key contribution to the understanding of this 
relationship has been the morphogenetic approach of Margaret Archer, which recognises 
“conditional and generative mechanisms operating between structure and agency” (1995: 16). 
Despite some morphogenetic analyses of workers’ agency (e.g. Mrozowicki, 2014; 
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Mrozowicki and Van Hootegem, 2008), there has been little consideration of this theory in 
the study of the corporate agency of employers’ associations and trade unions (together 
termed ‘social partners’). 
Accounts of social partners’ ability to effect change at best make assumptions about the 
capacity of actors to calculate (e.g. Johnston, 2016; Rhodes, 1998). As meso-level actors that 
negotiate wages at national and sectoral-level in most European countries, social partners 
represent a corporate agent that impact cultural and structural modelling (Archer, 2000: 265) 
by framing practical contexts of ordinary workers. However, as observed by Traxler et al. 
(2008), there is a need for more research which explores the efficacy of the bargaining 
coordination strategies of social partners and the extent to which they are driven by the macro 
conditions and transnational networks of social partners (see also Glassner and Pusch, 2013; 
Gollbach and Schulten, 2000). Knowledge of social partner agency thus adds context to 
studies of agency in firm-level settings. 
The present study analyses the wage-setting practices of German and Spanish social partners 
after the introduction of the Euro. We found that in Germany, despite allegations that unions 
manipulated competitiveness, the ability of unions to achieve such a feat at the time was 
limited. In the same period, in Spain, attempts by social partners to achieve competitiveness 
through tripartite pacts encountered related restraints. To understand the agentic role of social 
partners in relation to structural constraints, we therefore ask: How did social partners in 
German and Spain exercise their agency in the context of Eurozone imbalances which were 
caused by different collective bargaining systems and lack of coordination?  
 




The agency of social actors vis-à-vis structure has long been debated by sociologists, 
spanning Weber’s analysis of different forms of rationality, Durkheim’s evaluation of social 
structures and more deterministic Marxist approaches. In the last few decades, the 
morphogenetic approach of Margaret Archer (1995, 2000, 2013) has been particularly 
influential. In opposition to structurationists such as Giddens and Bourdieu, considered to 
underplay links between agency and structure, Archer emphasizes the way in which structure 
and agency are linked by time. Structure pre-conditions action in either an enabling or a 
constraining way; structure then may be either transformed by action in a morphogenetic 
cycle or reinforced through morphostasis. The importance of time in Archer’s work affords a 
study of social phenomena that is not confined to the present tense of the agency-structure 
relationship, but recognises that social phenomena through which actors seek to effect a 
change are products of structural conditions transformed or reinforced by past actors. 
Archer’s articulation of the morphogenetic approach originates from her early work (1996), 
but a clear articulation of its phases can be found in her recent elaboration:  
 
… at any given time, the social order is the result of the result of prior social relations 
conditioned in an antecedent structural (and cultural) context. Such relations between 
individuals and groups may be in conflict, coalition or consensus. When interaction leads to 
change the product of this interaction is ‘morphogenesis’, with ‘morpho’ indicating shape and 
‘genesis’ signalling that the shaping results from social relations. Hence, ‘morphogenesis’ 
refers to ‘those processes which tend to elaborate or change a system’s given form, state or 
structure’ (Buckley 1967, p. 58). Conversely, ‘morphostasis’ refers to those complex system-
environmental exchanges that tend to preserve or maintain a given form, organization or state 




Although agency and structure are in constant interaction, they are not ontologically 
conflated and must be studied separately. To this end, Archer develops the concept of 
analytical dualism. Treating agency as a separate analytical entity affords it explanatory 
power in relation to social structures. This is an important source of theoretical added value to 
our analysis of social partners’ agency because it allows for an elaboration of how meso-level 
actors can respond to macro-level complexity. In contrast, institutional theory, which has 
made great strides in progressing theoretical understanding of industrial relations (Morgan 
and Hauptmeier, 2014), has been criticised for “the failure to bring together insights from 
micro- and macro-level studies” and a “’downward’ reading of action” that prioritises 
structure over agency and reduces actors to passive carriers of institutions (Delbridge and 
Edwards, 2013: 928). Instead, Archer shows us how actors are not passive beings but may 
care enough about their interests to ‘see them through’ (2000: 2-3) and act to redesign 
structures over time.  
Particularly germane to the present analysis of social partners’ agency is Archer’s notion of 
‘corporate agents’, a role structure emerging from a strategic organisation of individuals with 
leadership, power and a mission in pursuit of social change1. In Archer’s words: 
 
Only those who are aware of what they want, can articulate it to themselves and to others, and 
have organised in order to obtain it, can engage in concerted action to reshape or retain the 
structural and/or cultural features in question. These are termed ‘Corporate Agents’: they 
 
1 This is in contrast with the primary agencies of persons who are not organised and do not have power to pursue 
collective vested interests (Archer, 1995).    
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include self-conscious vested interest groups, promotive interest groups, social movements and 
defensive associations (2000: 265). 
 
Corporate agents are regarded as representative of material and ideational collectives of 
persons with a desire to articulate shared interests, organize collective action and exert 
influence in decision making. The capacity to pursue such desired projects tends to be 
associated with a distribution of resources, such as wealth, expertise and sanction to act, that 
give corporate agents the collective bargaining power to negotiate power relations to 
elaborate morphogenesis of the socio-cultural context (Cuellar,  2010).  
One resource which increases the negotiating strength of agency is access to state structures; 
this is associated with advantages conferred by proximity to elites (Scott, 1991; 2008). For 
example, O’Sullivan (2007) emphasized the role of executives in shaping the French 
financial system; this took place in the context of ‘aggressive expansion’ by French financial 
institutions, which involved opportunities for the emergent enactment of managerial agency. 
Engelen et al. (2008) nonetheless urged caution, arguing in a study of activist investors that 
‘political reactions are institutionally pre-structured’.   
 
Yet, knowledge of social partner agency remains underdeveloped. Certain studies discuss 
agency in the context of trade union renewal (e.g. Mrozowicki et al., 2010). However, such 
works tend to concern one side of industry and specific campaigns. Studies of social partner 
reaction to European integration indicate ways in which agency is perceived. A tendency to 
over-privilege structural influences suggests that certain researchers are sceptical of the 
ability of social partners to plan responses to Europeanization (Scharpf, 1999; Streeck, 1996). 
Other scholars, often undertaking detailed analysis of wage-setting in the Eurozone, 
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sometimes emphasize the propensity of social partners to act strategically. However, these 
researchers tend to underline the role of actors in selecting particular courses of action, often 
using language which suggests that the achievement of competitiveness in the Eurozone is a 
social partners’ choice (Johnston, 2016; Rhodes, 1998). This risks moving towards the ‘free 
agency’ argument that privileges agency over structure.   
In recent times, issues associated with social partner agency have been debated more widely. 
Occurrences of intentional wage moderation have been noticed (Bofinger, 2015); specifically, 
German unions were alleged to have engaged in conscious wage moderation vis-à-vis 
European rivals following the introduction of the Euro, thus instigating trade imbalances and 
eventual debt crisis. This view has mainly been advanced in political and union circles, 
including by the Italian CGIL union (Seeliger, 2019), yet researchers have given it credence. 
Bofinger (2015) asserts that moderation by German unions ‘is an explicit attempt to devalue 
the real exchange rate internally.’ Writing prior to the crisis, Erne (2008) contended that 
unions in seven EU member states, including Germany and Italy, consciously competed after 
the introduction of the Euro. The evidence of Höpner and Seeliger (2019) is nonetheless 
inconsistent with these arguments; an IG Metall official told these researchers that practical 
issues such as lack of information impeded such strategies. 
Though the German case is contentious – a problem compounded by limited empirical 
examination of the phenomenon – there is less ambiguous evidence that this occurred in some 
contexts. Social pacts in Italy have explicitly referred to developments in other member states 
(Parsons and Pochet, 2008: 347), whilst a 1996 Belgian law limited wage rises vis-à-vis 
neighbouring countries (EurWORK, 2009). Consistent with the argument that the negotiating 
strength of corporate agency is enhanced by support from public authorities, there are 
grounds to think that state involvement facilitates such moderation. Evidence from France, in 
which the state assumes a primary role in wage setting (Hancké and Soskice, 2003), is 
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nonetheless ambiguous. In a study of the extent to which French public authorities considered 
wage rises in competing countries after the introduction of the Euro, Prosser (2018) found 
little indication that this was the case. 
The question of whether social partners consciously competed after the introduction of the 
Euro allows for wider theorization of corporate agency within its enabling or constraining 
socio-cultural conditions. Aside from the polemic which this matter has attracted, the topic 
concerns the key area of wage negotiations. Given the importance of this issue to social 
partners and subsequent resources which are dedicated to it, underpinned by the threat of 
strike action, there is clear potential for the evaluation of agency from a morphogenetic 
perspective. Our definition of social partner agency is inspired by Archer (1995: 118), who 
speaks of agency in relation to ‘being’ rather than ‘doing’: 
 
… agent’s capacity ‘to make a difference’ simply through their existence as members of 
collectivities with particular properties, which no amount of activity on their part can make 
other than they are at any given time. 
 
In other words, doing is the property of actors assuming roles within agencies. Agents may be 
inactive but their agency can still be consequential through their aggregate effects even if it is 
not consciously and deliberately exercised (such as trade unions’ ability to strike). Following 
the Archerian conception of agency, and crucially to our present analysis, structural 
constraints might block any alternative courses of action. Yet contrary to the Giddensian 
conception, this does not mean that agency is dissolved. 
In this paper, we explain the Archerian corporate agency of social partners in Germany and 
Spain. These countries were selected based on variation in two key independent variables: 
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competitive position within the Eurozone and collective bargaining system. This will allow 
assessment of social partner agency in discrepant conditions. The first of the countries, 
Germany, enjoys competitive advantage within the Eurozone and is characterized by a 
collective bargaining system based upon sectoral negotiations. After the launch of the Euro, 
many associated the predominance achieved by Germany with its collective bargaining 
system; it was argued that social partner discipline in the exposed sector and state-imposed 
limits on public sector wages (Johnston, 2016) led to the achievement of low unit labour costs 
(ULCs). To a degree which did not occur in other countries, there was also debate about the 
role of actor volition; certain authorities argued that trade unions engaged in unfair 
bargaining practices (Bofinger, 2015; Erne, 2008). Analysis of the German case thus allows 
assessment of the potential of social partners to plan competitiveness using sectoral 
bargaining institutions associated with high competitiveness.   
The second of the countries, Spain, occupies a disadvantaged position within the Eurozone 
and is characterized by a collective bargaining system in which inter-sectoral social partners 
conclude agreements which set guidelines for lower level negotiators. After the launch of the 
Euro, Spain incrementally lost competitiveness and entered crisis. This was associated with a 
collective bargaining model which is fragmented at sector and firm levels. It is argued that 
although inter-sectoral pacts aimed at moderation, such efforts were undermined by lower-
level indiscipline (Johnston, 2016). Although certain authorities emphasize attempts by social 
partners to moderate wages (Johnston, 2016), Spanish unions were not subject to the 
allegations endured by German counterparts. This was partly related to the failure of Spain to 
achieve competitiveness. Analysis of the case of Spain nonetheless allows assessment of the 
extent to which a planned response to EMU is feasible in a disadvantaged economic context, 




We focus on developments in 1999-2010. This spans the introduction of the Euro and the 
outbreak of debt crisis and is the time in which wage moderation is retrospectively debated. 
Given the proximity of the period and limited subsequent change to negotiating conventions, 
more recent examples of practice are also included. Our research question is operationalized 
with a twofold approach. Firstly, we assess the extent to which social partner bargaining 
strategies were motivated by awareness of developments in other European countries (see 
table 1). This goal is best pursued using a qualitative methodology. Analysis is based on data 
from relevant documentation and semi-structured research interviews. Awareness may be 
recognized by repeated allusion to developments in other European countries; this includes 
statements which justify wage moderation/increases with reference to other countries. 
Though lack of such mentions does not necessarily equate to the absence of cognizant 
strategies, European pressures potentially exerting a tacit influence over negotiators, it is 
implausible that such rationales would take root in entire organizations without evidence in 
studied sources.  
 
Table 1: What constitutes awareness of developments in other European countries? 
 
High level of awareness Consistent mention of developments in 
other European countries in relevant 
documentation. Explicit acknowledgement 
of social partner interviewees that wages 
were set with reference to developments in 
other member states.  
Medium level of awareness Occasional mention of developments in 
other European countries in relevant 
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documentation. Acknowledgement of social 
partner interviewees that wages were 
sometimes set with reference to 
developments in other member states. 
Low level of awareness Little mention of developments in other 
European countries in relevant 
documentation. Denial of social partner 
interviewees that wages were set with 
reference to developments in other member 
states. 
 
The second element of our approach involves assessment of the extent to which social 
partners at higher-levels were able to influence developments at lower-levels. Given that the 
ability of social partners to plan is contingent upon the capacity to control and sanction 
outcomes at sector and firm levels, this is crucial. Documentation and research interviews 
will yield information about this subject, though the insights of extant studies (e.g. Johnson, 
2016) are also invaluable. 
Analysed documentation included key collective agreements and social partner reports; using 
a series of keywords and closely examining relevant content, texts were searched for 
references to European and international influences on social partner behaviour. Semi-
structured research interviews were conducted between November 2016 and November 2018. 
Appendix one provides further details of interviews. Though the total of twelve interviews is 
small compared to certain studies, interviewees were elites who were closely involved in 
relevant negotiations. This meant that interviews provided deep insight into examined 




Six interviews were undertaken in Germany. Owing to the contested role of trade unions, 
interviews with unions were prioritized. Due to the importance of the metal sector – the 
industry is exposed to global competition and acts as a domestic pattern-setter – two 
interviews were conducted in this industry; these were with the trade union IG Metall and 
employers’ association Gesamtmetall. There were also interviews with two unions in key 
non-exposed sectors: the services union Ver.di and the construction union IG Bau. Interviews 
were also conducted with inter-sectoral social partners: the Bundesvereinigung der Deutschen 
Arbeitgeberverbände (BDA) employers’ association and Deutscher Gewerkschaftsbund 
(DGB) trade union confederation. Though these organizations are not involved in collective 
bargaining, they have an overview of relevant developments. 
Six interviews were undertaken in Spain. Interviews were conducted with representatives 
from the four social partner organizations which participate in inter-sectoral negotiations: the 
employers’ associations Confederación Española de Organizaciones Empresariales (CEOE) 
and Confederación Española de la Pequeña y Mediana Empresa (CEPYME) and trade unions 
Comisiones Obreras (CCOO) and Unión General de Trabajadores (UGT). Owing to the need 
to procure more specific information about sectoral developments, further interviewees were 
held with another UGT official and a researcher at Fundación 1º de Mayo: a research institute 
of CCOO. Interviews were transcribed and coded according to themes such as ‘evidence of 
conscious moderation’ and ‘structural causes of moderation’.  
 
Germany: accidental neo-mercantilism?  
 
Controversies regarding the participation of German unions in wage restraint are highly 
germane to debates concerning social partner corporate agency. In years following the 
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outbreak of crisis, German unions faced the charge that they had consciously suppressed 
wages vis-à-vis rivals in the Eurozone. According to Bofinger, wage moderation on the part 
of German unions ‘is an explicit attempt to devalue the real exchange rate internally’. Certain 
actions undertaken by German unions are cited in support of this argument. The willingness 
of IG Metall head Klaus Zwickel to accept a stagnation of real wages in the 1990s, when 
proposing Bündnis für Arbeit (Pact for Work), is therefore recalled (Wolf, 2000, cited in 
Bofinger, 2015). A January 2000 declaration by unions and employers which stated that 
productivity growth should lead to agreements which increase employment rather than real 
wages is also mentioned. This was the time of the Pforzheim agreement, during which 
restraint was encouraged by the government and social partners. In research interviews with 
metal sector social partners, it emerged that economic conditions in other countries, including 
ones in the Eurozone, were considered during wage negotiations. Though an official from the 
inter-sectoral employers’ association BDA was unaware of specific agreements, it was 
asserted that such a practice might exist and was more likely in export orientated sectors 
and/or border regions.  
Notwithstanding this evidence, there are good reasons for thinking that such plans were 
precluded by limits on social actors’ agency. Even if certain individuals and organizations 
may have attempted to undercut rivals at particular times, the systematic, long-term planning 
required to effect such an endeavour appears to have been absent. A first reason for 
scepticism concerns logistical difficulties associated with organization. Though the German 
socioeconomic system is famed for its ability to secure long-term outcomes, this propensity is 
promoted by structural features rather than the volition of actors. The ability of German firms 
to plan for the long-term is therefore not achieved through the ingenuity of firms, but rather 




There are not equivalent structures which encourage moderation vis-à-vis European rivals. A 
series of factors, reflecting the historic evolution of the German model of industrial relations, 
rather impede the exercise of agency in this sphere. Collective agreements are short in 
duration. They typically range from one to two years in length. Thousands of such 
agreements are also concluded and lower-level negotiators possess substantial levels of 
autonomy. In such circumstances, the organization of wage moderation which took stock of 
developments in other European countries would have required particularly elaborate 
planning. Had this planning been executed, it is inconceivable that significant evidence of it 
would have emerged. The fact that more evidence does not exist – there is little corroboration 
beyond that which is presented above – is therefore positive proof for the non-existence of 
such a scheme.  
When asked about the allegations, German unions denied them outright. A DGB interviewee 
said, 
 
‘German unions have often been accused, by the left in Europe in particular, of engaging in 
deliberate and conscious wage dumping; this is nonsense… [Awareness of development in 
other European countries and the need to achieve German competitiveness in the Eurozone 
were built into the objectives of DGB] to no extent at all. It was just not on the agenda. 
Nobody had realised that EMU would lead to different consequences as a result of the 
different behaviour of economic agents.’ 
 
Such denials are also reported by Höpner and Seeliger (2019). Though an IG Metall official 
acknowledged that the union was aware of negotiations in other countries, comparisons were 




‘We look at other countries, but more to explain to employers that there is no threat to 
competitiveness… The German automobile sector is the biggest, and we have always had 
greater productivity increases than other sectors. So the German industry is more of a threat 
for others than the other way round. But we look because we are confronted by the 
employers. They say there’s a threat and that we’re losing competitiveness.’ 
 
Particularly significantly, respondents from outside of the German trade union movement 
echoed the comments of union respondents. An official from the metalworking employers’ 
association Gesamtmetall asserted, 
 
‘I have the feeling there was no masterplan. Year by year we decided what to do. When we 
decided about this we had some figures, productivity from the point of view of employers. 
The most important points we discussed and the trade unions spoke about the inflation rate, 
productivity plus the inflation rate were added together, plus some redistribution… It was no 
masterplan but it was the result of a high productivity, higher than we have nowadays… and 
maybe a kind of moderate wage rises. Both together led to this falling and declining unit 
labour cost.’ 
 
Representatives from Ver.di added that local and regional industrial relations contexts felt 
remote from the European-level. Arguments about raising wages to increase domestic 
demand, to correct imbalances within the Eurozone, even featured in the strategies of unions 
in sheltered sectors, 
 
‘It’s clear that wages in Germany are too low and that the increase of wages in the past was 
too low. Our argument is that, because of the low increase of wages, demand is too low. So 
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because of the weak domestic demand the export surplus is so high… If higher wages were 
achieved it would lead to an increase in domestic demand, which would lead to a rise in 
imports, which would lead to a fall in the export surplus. So this is our main argument for 
higher wages; not to lower exports but to raise imports.’ 
 
Disavowals of German unions may be unsurprising, yet the challenges of keeping 
organizational secrets make them more plausible. Had such strategies been planned on an 
organizational level, it is likely that more evidence of them would have appeared; this is 
particularly the case given subsequent controversy. Documentary data are also supportive. A 
Gesamtmetall analysis of metal and electro sector collective agreements concluded between 
1990-2017 makes no mention of European developments in forty pages, while references are 
similarly scarce in reports by Hans-Böckler Foundation (WSI, 2000), IG Metall (2004) and 
chemical sector social partners. It is possible that the goal of competition may have become 
internalized by actors, such an instinct being scarcely discouraged by EMU, yet this is 
methodologically impossible to establish. Even if this had been the case, problems associated 
with coordination would have remained; accomplishment of a tacit objective is particularly 
unfeasible. 
The explicit exercise of certain agency by doing should not be denied. Aside from isolated 
examples of conscious moderation, the reflationary strategy articulated by Ver.di officials is 
indicative of volition. Some might also argue that the non-use of a general strategy of wage 
restraint was itself a choice, though there is little evidence of this. Notwithstanding these 
caveats, the existence of institutions which frustrated the capacity of social partners to engage 
in conscious moderation was more salient. Owing to the historical development of the 
German system of industrial relations, which privileged shorter-term, local strategies and 
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provided actors with very limited information about European developments, significant 
action failed to materialize.    
Though German industrial relations institutions constrained the exercise of social partner 
agency, such structures promoted non-intentional moderation, incrementally providing 
Germany with advantage in the Eurozone. The difficult economic conditions which 
confronted Germany in the 1990s and early 2000s were a relevant factor. In this time GDP 
growth was sluggish and unemployment high; this was the result of difficulties responding to 
globalization and the challenge of reunification. There were few pressures for wage rises in 
such circumstances; unions preferred to conclude agreements which safeguarded employment 
(Horn, 2016).  
Constraints associated with the German industrial relations system also exerted downward 
pressure on wage increases. As a result of processes associated with globalization, trade 
union density and collective bargaining coverage declined in decades prior to the crisis. In 
these years, owing to the prevalence of opt-outs from collective agreements and measures 
such as the Hartz reforms, firms became able to set wages more flexibly (Garz, 2013). In the 
German case, the existence of institutions which guaranteed moderation in the non-exposed 
sector was also crucial. Johnston (2016) draws attention to state refusal to liberalize public 
sector bargaining, arguing that this ‘allowed public employers to retain important veto 
powers in wage determination for civil servants, enabling them to limit public sector wage 
increases under EMU… [and uphold] Germany’s export-centric pattern bargaining system’ 
(p. 112). In other contexts, notably those in Southern Europe, the absence of such institutions 





Spain: inadvertently towards the abyss? 
European developments have long influenced Spanish collective bargaining. Following the 
agreement of EMU convergence criteria in the early 1990s, reforms were made to the 
Spanish labour market which made pay setting more flexible and were complemented by 
pacts between employers and unions (Johnston, 2016: 147). Social partners continued to 
attempt to moderate wages after the introduction of the Euro. A series of inter-sectoral 
agreements, concluded throughout the 2000s, aimed to guarantee Spanish competitiveness 
(Johnston, 2016; EurWORK, 2005). Trade unions consented to such a strategy, though 
prioritized investment and quality employment over the cutting of wages and temporary 
employment.  
Certain scholars of these pacts emphasize actor cognizance. Though such studies do not 
directly concern social partner agency, in contrast to literature on the German case, it tends to 
be assumed that social partners were conscious of the need to achieve moderation within the 
Eurozone; Johnston asserts that Spanish unions ‘aligned with employers and government in 
their support for wage moderation, not only for the sake of fulfilling the Maastricht criteria, 
but also to enhance Spanish price competitiveness under monetary union’ (p. 139). González 
Begega and Luque Balbona (2014) write in a similar vein, asserting that ‘EMU pushed social 
partners toward consensus and provided an explanatory framework to accommodate other 
causes’ (p. 88). 
Care must nonetheless be taken when assessing the extent to which this represented a 
conscious strategy to achieve competitiveness vis-à-vis other Eurozone countries. The 
general goal of Spanish competitiveness preoccupied unions, employers and state, yet this 
was formulated in somewhat vague terms; reference to more general European and 
international challenges, rather than ones specifically related to the need to achieve 
competitiveness within the Eurozone, tend to appear in declarations. In contrast to the Italian 
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case, in which social pacts explicitly referred to developments in other member states 
(Parsons and Pochet, 2008: 347), Spanish tripartism exhibits little awareness of external 
competition. A 2003 intersectoral agreement makes brief reference to the need to keep 
inflation at levels similar to other European countries (BOE, 2003: 7541), yet the remainder 
of a detailed document says nothing that is more specific and discusses challenges related to 
competitiveness in very general terms.  
A key tripartite declaration of 2004, concerning competitiveness, stable employment and 
social cohesion, also makes no precise references to challenges related to European economic 
governance in eight pages of text (Gobierno de España et al., 2004). Analysis of other 
documents yields similar results. Though one cannot affirm the non-existence of conscious 
competition – this may have been feasible in less complex firm-level contexts – there is little 
evidence to suggest that such strategies were widespread. As with the case of Germany, it is 
reasonable to attribute such lack of exhaustive planning to difficulties associated with long-
term calculation. It is easy to suppose in hindsight that the specific goal of competitiveness 
within the single currency exercised key influence on the minds of social partners, yet in the 
distinct context of the pre-crisis years this was merely one consideration amongst others.   
Data from interviews confirm this interpretation. On the one hand, there was 
acknowledgement that social partners were aware of developments in other countries. A UGT 
official reported that examples of good practice inspired policies in areas such as equality and 
welfare, whilst it was recognized that wage negotiators were aware of developments in other 
contexts. A CCOO interviewee referred to the latest intersectoral agreement which, on its 
first page, took stock of the European and international environment. Notwithstanding 
awareness of wider developments, interviewees were unanimous on one point; social partners 
did not consider wages in other European countries when negotiating agreements. The 




‘The answer is brief. Intersectoral agreements do not take into account or make reference to 
working conditions in other countries.’  
 
As in Germany, the non-existence of conscious moderation reflected institutional influences. 
Though a tradition of inter-sectoral agreements which advance economic development exists 
in Spain, which is not true of Germany, limited information on European developments is 
available to inter-sectoral social partners. Interviewees also identified a series of specific 
constraints. A UGT official underlined differences between the Spanish model of industrial 
relations and certain northern European systems, whilst a respondent from Fundación 1º de 
Mayo, a research institute of CCOO, asserted that the practice was inhibited by economic 
structures,  
 
‘[I think that European benchmarks tend to be used] in countries where there are links 
between productive models - social partners might try and include such indicators because 
they have a common structure. For example, German sectors are very connected to Finland or 
Belgium. So it would make sense for Finnish social partners to include such indicators - their 
productive structure is really connected.’  
 
In the Spanish case, a serious structural constraint is the capacity of inter-sectoral social 
partners to influence developments at lower levels. Social partners at sectoral level enjoy 
pronounced autonomy. Not only is bargaining devolved to provincial level, but no sector 
establishes a strong pattern for negotiations elsewhere; this latter characteristic contrasts with 
Germany, in which the metal sector acts as a pattern setter, though is common in other 
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southern European countries, in which bargaining is similarly disorganized. A UGT official 
emphasized limits associated with inter-sectoral agreements,  
 
'Although federations, across sectors, have the ability to sign agreements with their own 
particular conditions, and specific to their trade or sector, the conditions agreed in inter-
sectoral agreements are non-obligatory recommendations... In short, they serve as a guide for 
future negotiations.' 
 
Such inability to influence pay-setting at lower levels represents a major constraint on the 
ability of social partners to formulate coherent strategies. Even if inter-sectoral social partners 
had desired to plan competitiveness within EMU, they lacked institutional means to enforce 
such a strategy. Interviewees were aware of this; a respondent from CEPYME noted that, in 
addition to factors identified by other respondents, the recommendatory nature of inter-
sectoral level agreements meant that they were ill-suited to the enforcement of wage rates 
benchmarked against European standards.    
Agreements concluded during the 2000s moreover failed to stem the growth of unit labour 
costs (ULCs); as the decade progressed, the price of Spanish labour appreciated relative to 
northern European countries such as Germany. This exposed Spain to economic crisis and 
deregulation (Rocha, 2018) and was associated with the problem of lower-level bargaining 
fragmentation. In the private sector, Johnson emphasizes the provincial character of wage 
bargaining, drawing attention to a 1998 metalworking agreement which, although concluded 
at national level, stipulated that wage bargaining would remain devolved (2016: 139). 
Though German collective bargaining is also provincial, there were key differences in the 
Spanish public sector. Competence in public sector pay setting was devolved to regional 
governments in the late 1990s/early 2000s; this encouraged agreements which overshot 
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targets agreed at higher levels (Johnston, 2016: 139) and contrasted with more disciplined 
public sectors in Northern Europe. 
 
How do social partners as corporate agents exercise their agency? 
 
This study has sought to add to the industrial relations debate of how social partners’ 
collective bargaining strategies are influenced by structural constraints vis-à-vis their vested 
interests (Glassner and Pusch, 2013; Gollbach and Schulten, 2000; Traxler et al., 2008). To 
this aim, we examined how social partners in Germany and Spain engaged in wage 
moderation after the introduction of the Euro. We found moderate evidence of actors’ explicit 
actions when confronted with structural constraints, such as corporate governance and 
business financing systems in Germany and devolution and disorganisation of bargaining in 
Spain. Yet, we pointed to latent processes that involved deliberate consideration of 
exogenous factors, including the economic conditions in other countries, pressures from 
employers and strength of certain industries, indicating potential for actions. Therefore, rather 
than diluting the understanding of agency to a carrier of institutional constraints, we suggest 
that social partners’ involvement in wage moderation can be viewed as a form of agency by 
being rather than doing (Archer, 1995) that involves a review of positions, interests and 
available strategies vis-à-vis existing structural constraints with a possibility to redesign 
structures over time. As Royo (2007) argued, such actions can lead to institutional evolution 
over time, which undermines the limited utility of institutional theory. 
Crucially, in our analysis, the Eurocrisis emerged as a point beyond which disruptive change 
can occur (see Streeck and Thelen, 2005). We found that after this point social partners’ 
action was not, necessarily, in the direction of European coordination because of structural 
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constraints at the time. This does not mean that coordination as a form of implicit agency 
could not emerge in the future. Wage trends indeed reversed in the countries after 2012, with 
moderation in Spain and expansion in Germany, showing that successful coordination rests 
on the agency vis-à-vis structure relationship at a given time, confirming Archerian temporal 
prospects for better coordination.  
At the time, however, there were two specific structural constraints: (i) restricted cognition of 
the external environment and (ii) inability to control lower-bargaining levels. The first 
problem, restricted cognition of the external environment, was more considerable than is 
commonly emphasized (Johnston, 2016; Rhodes, 1998). In this study, it is demonstrated by 
the minor extent to which European preoccupations were voiced by interviewees and appear 
in relevant documents. It is admittedly possible that European pressures might have exercised 
a tacit influence over negotiators, leading to bargaining practices which aimed at 
retrenchment (see Bulfone and Afonso, 2020). Rather than being a by-product of structure, 
this retrenchment is an example of Archerian conditioned action that shows how corporate 
agents are unable to change practices in certain times (Delbridge and Edwards, 2013). 
Though this may have happened in isolated cases, the fact that large organizations took part 
in such negotiations implies that, had these influences been comprehensive, it is highly 
probable that there would be more evidence.  
 
The second difficulty was the inability to control lower-bargaining levels. In Germany, the 
capacity of actors to plan competitiveness was constrained by the complexity of sectoral 
negotiations, whilst in Spain social partners had difficulty controlling developments in private 
and public sectors. Yet just because this type of coordination was not expressed at the time, 
the potential for it did not dissolve. This is an important finding from the morphogenetic 
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perspective, because literature often underplays the lower-level processes upon which 
successful actor decisions are contingent. 
 
Outcomes admittedly differed in the two countries. Germany attained lower ULCs than Spain 
and, after the onset of the economic crisis, differences in fortunes were marked. The key 
difference was collective bargaining structures. In Germany, the coherence of private sector 
bargaining and centralization of public sector pay setting ensured that moderation was 
achieved. In Spain, private sector fragmentation and public sector decentralization led to an 
inverse outcome. These institutions reflected the past decisions of actors. Following the logic 
of historical institutionalism (Thelen, 1999) and Archerian morphogenesis, they constrained 
the choices of subsequent generations. Yet, the latter approach views pre-conditioned 
structures as subject to a potential redesign by new actions. 
 
Choices made by actors who were more institutionalised than social partners were 
undoubtedly significant in certain instances. The decision of German public authorities to 
retain control of public sector pay setting was crucial to the achievement of competitiveness. 
A different decision by Spanish public authorities, allowing decentralization of pay setting to 
regional level, had an opposite effect. It is nonetheless problematic to assert that such 
decisions were taken with competitiveness within the Eurozone in mind; at this time, pay 
decentralization was associated with economic efficiency. In Germany, there appear to have 
been cases of unions engaging in conscious moderation (e.g. Bofinger, 2015), even if these 
are difficult to prove. Though instances of such conduct did not emerge in Spain, it is likely 
that certain actors engaged in this behaviour; this would have been feasible in less complex 




Though structures such as external complexity and collective action difficulties constrained 
the power of social partners to undertake activities, in contexts where these conditions 
relented, such as less complex private sector environments, actor agency appeared to 
facilitate stronger negotiating power. Yet, the execution of these strategies is likely to remain 
problematic; such plans rely on consistent information, the formulation of long-term goals by 
actors with discrete aims and lower-level compliance. As the cases of Germany and Spain 
demonstrate, these are difficult to achieve, but not entirely impossible over time. More 
forgiving structural conditions may afford certain national social partners an enhanced 
capacity to actively plan in the pursuit of competitiveness.  
 
A key finding is that macro and meso-context social partners should be perceived as 
corporate agents regardless of how much they can ‘do’ desired projects at the time (Archer, 
2000). This insight is important because actor agency at these levels has received little 
previous attention and, if read off structures in a downward fashion, it could have been 
diluted. Outcomes in these settings are nonetheless crucial; they frame possibilities open to 
lower level actors. Scholars of agency in occupational contexts are scarcely unaware of 
external constraints, yet this study indicates the temporally contextual character of 
morphostatic limitations at higher levels influencing (in)action in lower-level contexts.  
 
Macro and meso-context social partners contrast with corporate agents with stronger 
negotiating power, such as MNCs and central state agencies, in three ways. First, there is the 
complexity of the external environment in which social partners function. In the studied case, 
actors operated in a European system in which multiple competitors concluded numerous 
agreements concerned with diverse aspects of the employment relationship. In these 
conditions, the formulation of coherent strategy was highly onerous, particularly since the 
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institutions available to social partners provided scant information about European 
developments. 
Second, the domestic bargaining regimes in which social partners are embedded involve 
issues with coordination and the control of lower-bargaining levels. Though other actors 
encounter difficulties managing lower levels – coordination of MNC subsidiaries can be 
onerous – the challenges faced by social partners were especially acute. Certain affiliates 
have substantial autonomy, leading to temporal situations where inter-sectoral social partners 
are unable to control lower-level outcomes.  
 
Third, social partners have limited access to state support and resources. As literature on 
elites recognizes, such advantages enhance actor agency (Scott, 1991; 2008). Though social 
partners in studied cases had some recourse to state structures, particularly in Spain in which 
there is a tradition of tripartite pacts, this was sporadic at best and is elevated in few European 
contexts. Greater state support would scarcely have resolved the two other problems yet 
would likely have ameliorated matters. The example of Belgium, in which the state limited 
wage rises vis-à-vis neighbouring countries by law, is notable. State support may not be a 
panacea, yet it alleviates problems faced by social partners.  
 
In terms of study limitations, social partners are just one industrial relations actor. 
Theorization of the case of social partners nonetheless contributes to literature on corporate 
agency, indicating particular conditions in which strategic agentic action is constrained. 
According to Archer, talking of strategic action in the context of corporate agency implies 
that corporate agents are ‘active’ rather than intrinsically passive, with any apparent passivity 
seen as deliberate in bringing about desired social outcomes (2000: 266). Here, we add to the 
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explanation of corporate agency, at least for macro and meso-level social partners, stressing 
the crucial role of morphostatic influences on passivity in wage setting practices. 
 
Restrictions on how the studied case represents the totality of social partner undertakings 
should nonetheless be acknowledged. Social partners engage in activities besides wage 
bargaining; comparisons with neighbouring countries is also a specific form of bargaining. 
Further research on the conditions for agentic ‘doing’ versus ‘being’ would be welcome. 
 
Following the crisis, German unions were blamed for intentional moderation. Our results 
show weaknesses of this argument, suggesting that critics should be sensitive to 
contemporary challenges. Future wage coordination appears unlikely. Even if the last decade 
has seen wide-ranging Europeanization of economic governance, this has not affected wage 
negotiations (Prosser, 2016); the trends in our cases are therefore set to endure. 
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Appendix 1: List of semi-structured research interviewees 
 





BDA German employers’ 
association 
November 2018 Telephone 
DGB German trade union February 2017 Face-to-face 
Gesamtmetall German employers’ 
association 
February 2017 Face-to-face 
IG Bau German trade union February 2017 Face-to-face 
IG Metall German trade union February 2017 Face-to-face 
Ver.di German trade union February 2017 Face-to-face 
CCOO Spanish trade union November 2016 Face-to-face 
CEOE Spanish employers’ 
association 
November 2016 Face-to-face 
CEPYME Spanish employers’ 
association 
December 2018 Telephone 
Fundación 1º de 
Mayo 
Research institute of 
CCOO 
June 2018 Face-to-face 
UGT (official 1) Spanish trade union November 2016 Face-to-face 
UGT (official 2) Spanish trade union June 2018 Face-to-face 
 
